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The Battle of Es Sinn was a military engagement during the Mesopotamian Campaign of World War I. The battle was fought to determine control of the lower Tigris and Euphrates rivers in what is now Iraq. It was also viewed, by the British and Indian governments, as a test of the Ottoman forces and whether a further advance to capture Baghdad was possible. The battle took place on 28 September 1915 between Anglo-Indian forces of Indian Expeditionary Force D, under the command of Major-General Charles Vere Ferres Townshend, and Ottoman forces commanded by Colonel Nureddin. The engagement took place just south of the town of Kut-al-Amarah, along the banks of the Tigris River. Following a night march, the British and Indian troops defeated the Ottoman forces, driving them from their defensive positions along the Tigris. The capture of the Es Sinn position allowed for the capture of Kut, and with it control over the lower Tigris and Euphrates rivers, by British forces the following day. == Background == After consolidating their hold over the Basra Vilayet, a debate began over what to do with Indian Expeditionary Force "D". While originally only envisioned as a limited campaign to secure the oil pipeline at Abadan, the success of the British and Indian troops in late 1914 and early 1915 caused the planners in Simla and in the field to re-evaluate the mission. The British government in London wanted the campaign to be kept to the absolute minimum. Their primary concern was the defense of Basra and the Shatt al Arab. They had to be held to ensure that oil from Abadan, needed to fuel the Royal Navy, would not be disrupted. The Viceroy and Indian government at Simla viewed the problem differently. They saw a chance to demonstrate that British Empire was still pre-eminent in the region, despite the stalemate on the Western Front and deteriorating situation in Gallipoli.〔Roger Adelson, ''London and The Invention of The Middle East: Money, Power, and War 1902–1922'', (New London: Yale University Press, 1995), p. 121.〕 The best way to ensure Indian security, as well as those of the Abadan oil supply was to advance at least as far as the Shatt al Hai, the canal connecting the Tigris and Euphrates River, and ideally by capturing Baghdad.〔Brig.Gen. F.J. Moberly, ''The History of the Great War Based On Official Documents: The Campaign In Mesopotamia 1914–1918, Vol. 1'', (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1923) p. 303.〕 From the perspective of the Indian Army officers on the ground in Basra, the time to strike was now. Their intelligence reports showed that the only troops blocking their advance upriver were the battered and demoralized remnants of the two divisions which had been defeated by I.E.F. "D" at the battles of Nasiriyeh and Qurna. Furthermore, it was unlikely that the Ottoman divisions could expect much in the way of support from the local populations. The soldiers in the Ottoman Divisions were conscripts, rarely paid and generally under-supplied. The conscripts which came from the Anatolian provinces were looked on as occupiers while the conscripts from the Kurdish and Arab provinces were likely to be more sympathetic to Arab or Kurdish national movements that were starting and their morale suffer correspondingly.〔Captain Richard Alan Lechowich, Against All Odds: The Turks and The Mesopotamian Campaign: 1914–1918 (Master's Thesis, Department of History, University of Virginia, 1992), p. 72.〕 While the British Government sought to keep the campaign to a minimum, in order to conserve resources needed on the Western Front, control over the campaign was still vested in the Viceroy's government in Simla. The high command of I.E.F. "D" successfully lobbied Simla for orders which would allow it to advance further north, which were approved by Secretary of State for India in London. However, Austen Chamberlain, the Secretary of State for India, warned Simla that while its actions were approved, victory would have to be achieved with the forces already in theater. No reinforcements could be expected from other theatres of the war.〔Rt. Hon. Austen Chamberlain, Mesopotamia Commission Testimony, 21 December 1916 (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1917), p. 796.〕 抄文引用元・出典: フリー百科事典『 ウィキペディア（Wikipedia）』 ■ウィキペディアで「Battle of Es Sinn」の詳細全文を読む スポンサード リンク
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